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interest" (clearly a loose expression for "what is thought to be the general interest") "has been the determining cause of the transformation of moral ideas." Now the statement that what is thought to be for the general interest is *identical with* what is thought to be moral, is clearly not the same as (indeed it is inconsistent with) this new statement that opinions about the general interest have always *caused* opinions about morality. The latter statement would have to be proved by considerations quite different from any which M. Belot adduces in its support on pages 240, *seq.*; and, even if proved, it would be irrelevant to his main view that utility is either a criterion or the definition of morality.

Such are some of the confusions which pervade this book. The points in question are so fundamental that confusion on them seems almost entirely to denude M. Belot's work of value as a contribution to philosophy, in spite of the acuteness which he displays in discussing various topics of history and of contemporary life.

S. WATERLOW.

Rye, England.

THE STOIC CREED. By William L. Davidson, LL.D., Professor of Logic and Metaphysics in the University of Aberdeen, Edinburgh: T. & T. Clark, 1907.

The amount of attention we in this country have had to spare for ancient philosophy has been chiefly given to Plato and Aristotle. Among other movements of that great period of speculative activity which have had by comparison but meagre treatment, can be mentioned the Stoic philosophy. Contrasted, also, with the mass of scholarly and thoughtful work on this subject done in Germany and France, the British output shrinks to the slimmest dimensions. The neglect thus indicated cannot, as Professor Davidson's book makes clear, be put down to the absence either of difficulties to tempt the ingenious interpreter or of robust and stimulating thinking to attract the philosopher. At any rate the fact of the poverty of British literature on this topic stands, and it has been rightly seized by our author as his opportunity. And he has taken advantage of it to furnish us with a more thorough treatment of Stoicism than has hitherto

been attempted by any writer in these islands. The origin and purpose of the book—it appears, as did Wallace's brilliant little monograph on Epicureanism, as one of a series—imposes certain limitations upon the writer. Thus even though it be admitted that logic was a secondary interest to the Stoics, yet that aspect of the doctrine of a school which had Chrysippus as one of its lights, which introduced the hypothetical and disjunctive syllogism which brought out the importance and significance of the judgment as the unit of discourse, deserves fuller treatment than Professor Davidson has found it possible to give. On the certainly more important point of the theory of knowledge our author is fuller and more satisfactory. If a criticism on this portion of his volume is to be made, it would be that the distinction between the grounds of belief and the criteria of knowledge is not clearly drawn by the writer, as it was not clearly perceived by the Stoics and that therefore he is inclined to attach more value to this part of their teaching than it can, we think, fairly claim. In the difficult places of the Stoic "Physics," or more accurately Ontology, and the question of its relation to the ethical doctrine, Professor Davidson steers a shrewd and discerning course. He does what can be done to harmonize these, but admits in the end that these two sides hang but loosely together and are "metaphysically not of a piece." There is no doubt that the earlier Stoics at all events regarded the relation of their ontological to their ethical doctrine as vital, but it is also clear that the growing tendency was to develop ethics on independent lines so that the ontology came to be at best "the scaffolding," as has been neatly said, "rather than the basis" of the ethical structure. The strong impulse of the school toward the practical and "edifying" aspects of experience led them to appeal directly to the deliverances of the moral consciousness without over much regard to the possibility of reconciling them with their materialistic and necessitarian "physics." It is for this reason that the Stoic materialism is, as Professor Davidson somewhat quaintly puts it, "practically innocuous," and not so "baneful" as it might at first glance appear. With regard to what may be called the phenomenology of ethics to which the Stoics were valuable contributors, Professor Davidson's account is very full, well balanced and interesting. The many carefully chosen and apt quotations which he has been at some pains to bring together, are a useful feature of this part of the book. One point he has perhaps not stressed

sufficiently, namely, the individualistic element in the Stoic ethics. He comments fully on their enthusiasm for humanity and their insistence upon the social character of morality, but it ought at the same time to be pointed out that at the core there was this strong individualistic strain, a tendency on the part of the Stoic to maintain the "four-square" attitude toward life and to save his soul alive whatever might befall. Their doctrine of suicide, *e. g.*, is an indication of this.

The chapter on "The Present-day Value of Stoicism," successfully and interestingly enforces the thesis that Stoicism is something more than a subject of antiquarian interest, and in the Appendix the author applies some of the results of his study to the ever-present question of Pragmatism. The study of Stoicism indeed is an appropriate propædæutic to the considerations of this modern "discovery." If Stoicism had been better known and understood the said "discovery" might possibly not have been made.

In sum, Professor Davidson has placed several classes of readers in his debt by this clear, level-headed, and yet sympathetic piece of work. He is surely underestimating the vitality of philosophy in supposing that it is in these days confined to a place in university curricula, and we believe that his book will be of profit and interest not only to the professed student, but to many laymen who preserve a hankering for the things of the mind.

ALEXANDER MAIR.

The University of Liverpool.

THE REFORM MOVEMENT IN JUDAISM. By David Philipson.
New York: The Macmillan Co., 1907. Pp. 581.

Dr. Philipson has embodied in his book a large amount of interesting material bearing on the history of the Jews in Europe and in this country during the past century. A great deal of this material, such as resolutions and reports of committees of various conferences, was not easily accessible, and the author has done valuable service in putting this material together and making what is, on the whole, a very readable book on an interesting phase in the history of Judaism.

It might, perhaps, have been better if, in the body of the book,